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PRIVATE JUDGES, PUBLIC JURIES:
THE OHIO LEGISLATURE SHOULD
REWRITE R.C. § 2701.10 TO
EXPLICITLY AUTHORIZE PRIVATE
JUDGES TO CONDUCT JURY TRIALS
INTRODUCTION
Early in the twentieth century, Roscoe Pound described the
American legal system as a horse-and-buggy system near collapse-
courts were congested, delay was endemic, and costs were high.' As
dissatisfaction with the legal system increased during the early
decades of the twentieth century, there was renewed interest in
alternatives to litigation.2 During the 1970s, the United States
experienced an unprecedented legal explosion that finally
institutionalized alternative dispute resolution. Out of this congested
atmosphere of urgency grew a unique and controversial alternative to
the traditional courts: private judging.
Known popularly as "rent-a-judge," the private-judging system
was first instituted in 1976 in California, amid the staggering
onslaught of litigation that plagued that court system.4 Private judging
allows parties to bypass the clutter of traditional courts by removing
I JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW 95 (1983).
2 Id. at 96.
3 John H. Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 27 STAN. L. REv. 567, 567 (1974);
AUERBACH, supra note 1, at 120-21.
4 The California private-judging system emerged in 1976 pursuant to CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §§ 638-645.1 (West 2007) and CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 21. At that time, the delay in
California approached four years in some superior courts. Steven K. Haynes, Comment, Private
Means to a Public Ends: Implication of the Private Judging Phenomenon in California, 17 U.C.
DAViS L. REv. 611, 611-14 (1984); Helen 1. Bendix & Richard Chemick, Renting the Judge, 21
LmG. 33, 35 (1994) ("According to the California Judicial Council, in 1988 less than half of the
civil cases in certain metropolitan counties were being disposed of in less than two years, and 10
percent of the cases had to wait more than 4-1/2 years for a civil trial date.").
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their dispute for resolution by a neutral third party, usually a retired
judge. The parties are afforded the freedom to select the private judge
whom they feel is best suited to try their dispute. The parties are then
responsible for compensating the private judge. The private judge has
the full authority of the court, and his decision is enforceable and
appealable in the public courts.
Many states have embraced private judging.5 In those jurisdictions,
private judging helps to ameliorate overburdened systems and gives
litigants yet another alternative to the traditional courts. Indeed,
private judging (1) is cost-effective, (2) provides tailored expertise,
(3) preserves appellate review, (4) is convenient, (5) protects private
information, and (6) helps to alleviate congested dockets. Despite the
many advantages of the system, private judging is often criticized.
Critics deplore the system as an alternative form of justice for the rich
that siphons experienced judges away from the public sector to
secretly resolve disputes beyond the purview of the public.6 But many
of the criticisms can be equally applied to other alternative-dispute-
resolution processes, such as arbitration and mediation, "which have
generally been supported-indeed encouraged-by practitioners,
consumers of legal services, and legislatures. 7 Moreover, some
criticisms unfairly target private judging, when, in fact, they have
equal application to the American justice system as a whole.
One downside for litigants who choose to submit their disputes to
a private judge is that, in doing so, they are occasionally required to
waive their Seventh-Amendment right to a jury trial. For instance,
Indiana's statute states, "A trial conducted by a private judge shall be
conducted without a jury."8 In contrast, Colorado's legislature has
explicitly authorized private judges to conduct jury trials.9 Ohio's
private-judging statute is silent on the issue of jury trials.' Some
interpreted this ambiguity to be permissive. As a result, private judges
in Ohio had been conducting jury trials. Recently, a Cuyahoga
County Court of Common Pleas judge brought suit to prevent
privately-judged jury trials. In 2006, in Russo v. McDonnell,1 the
5 The statutory procedures and nomenclature vary widely among states. Those states that
have established procedures for private judging, as the term is used in this Note, include
California, Texas, New York, Alabama, Florida, Indiana, Colorado, and Ohio.
6 See Bendix & Chemick, supra note 4, at 33.
7 RICHARD CHERNICK, HELEN I. BENDIX & ROBERT C. BARRETT, PRIVATE JUDGING:
PRIVATIZING CIVIL JUSTICE, 34 (Roger Clegg ed., National Legal Center for the Public Interest
1997).
8 IND. CODE ANN. § 33-38-10-4 (2007); See also TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 151.002(2) (Vernon 2007).
9 COLO. R. CIV. P. 122.
10 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2701.10 (West 2007).
" 852 N.E.2d 145 (Ohio 2006).
[Vol. 58:2
PRIVATE JUDGES
Ohio Supreme Court held that state law did not authorize private
judges to conduct jury trials. The thesis of this Note is that, although
the Ohio Supreme Court's decision stems from a plausible reading of
an ambiguous statute, the resulting policy implications negatively
affect Ohio's judicial system, and the legislature should rewrite Ohio
Revised Code § 2701.10 to explicitly allow private judges to conduct
jury trials.
Part I of this Note will provides a general overview of private
judging, followed in Part II by an examination of the statutory
private-judging system in Ohio. Part III highlights the many
advantages of the system and demonstrates the ways private judging
benefits private litigants, the traditional court system, and public
litigants, alike. Part IV addresses the common public-policy and
constitutional criticisms of the system and reveals the tenuous
foundation upon which such proclaimed faults lie. Part V will then
examine Russo v. McDonnell, as well as the surrounding cases and
events. Part VI conducts a cost-benefit analysis of privately-judged
jury trials. Finally, Part VII discusses how the jury-selection process
should work in privately-judged proceedings.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PRIVATE JUDGING SYSTEM
Private judging is a term sometimes used to refer to any
alternative-dispute-resolution process conducted by an official who is
not a sitting judge.12 But, more commonly, the term is used to refer to
a court's reference for trial of an action in its entirety or of specific
issues of fact or law "to a presiding official selected by the parties,
whose decision is fully reviewable and enforceable in the public
courts."'13 This Note uses the more common, narrow definition of the
term. In this sense, private judging is distinguished from arbitration,
mediation, and other nonbinding alternative-dispute-resolution
processes. 14
Although the statutory procedures and nomenclature vary widely
among states, private judging generally shares the following
characteristics: (1) it is voluntary, requiring the consent of both
parties; (2) the parties select the private judge; (3) the private judge is
usually a former judge or a lawyer; (4) there is flexibility as to
scheduling the time and place of the proceeding; (5) there is an
12 CHERNICK, BENDIX & BARRETT, supra note 7, at 4.
13 Id. at 4-5.
14 Id. at 5. Arbitration is "a private adjudication process with a very limited right of court
review." Id. Mediation and other nonbinding dispute resolution processes use neutral third
parties to facilitate negotiation or promote settlement. Id. The neutral third party need not be a
former judge or lawyer. Id.
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opportunity for each side to present proof and arguments; (6) the
outcome is typically a reasoned, written decision, supported by
findings of fact and conclusions of law; (7) the private judge's
decision is binding, and the outcome is subject to appeal. 5
Private judging originated in California. The statutory and
constitutional provisions authorizing private judging in California
existed long before anyone began to use them with any regularity.
16
But it was not until the last quarter of the twentieth century that the
private-judging system became popular in California. 17
"Approximately one-half of the states now make available some form
of private judging."'18 The primary impetus for the system's growing
popularity is "the increasing number and complexity of cases
demanding the courts' attention."' 9 As traditional litigation has grown
more costly and cumbersome, legislatures have sought to provide, and
litigants have gravitated towards, alternative forums that are quicker
and more cost-effective.2 °
II. PRIVATE JUDGING IN OHIO
Ohio's private-judging statute took effect on September 26,
1984.21 Litigants were slow to recognize the opportunity the statute
provided, and the system went unused in Ohio as late as 1988.22 By
1992, litigants were utilizing the system; however, the use was
minimal.23 Between 1992 and 2005, the number of cases referred to
15 Id. at 5; see also STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, FRANK E.A. SANDER & NANCY H. ROGERS,
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 4-5 tbls. 1-1 & 1-2
(2d ed. 1992).
16 CHERNICK, BENDIX & BARRETT, supra note 7, at 21. California law authorizes two
types of private trials: trials conducted by a referee and trials conducted by a temporary judge-
both may serve as private judges. The constitutional provision authorizing temporary judges was
enacted in 1966. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 21. The general referee statute dates back to 1872. CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 638 historical note (West 2007). Anne S. Kim, Rent-A-Judges and the Cost
of Selling Justice, 44 DUKE L.J. 166, 168 (1995).
17 CHERNICK, BENDIX & BARRETT, supra note 7, at 21.
IS Winslow Christian, Private Judging, in THE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
PRACTICE GUIDE 2 (Bette J. Roth, Randall W. Wulff & Charles A. Cooper eds., 2006)
(acknowledging that the characteristics of the forum display significant state-by-state diversity
and identifying three general types of private judicial officers). For a detailed discussion on
available private-judging services, see generally NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS,
GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF LAWYERS TO SUPPLEMENT RESOURCES (1984) (Appendix A
provides a preliminary survey of all states).
19 CHERNICK, BENDIX & BARRETT, supra note 7, at 22.
20 Id. at 22-23.
21 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2701.10 (West 2007).
22 Amy L. Litkovitz, The Advantages of Using a "Rent-a-Judge" System in Ohio, 10
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 491,492 (1995).
23 Id. at n.1 1 (citing SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, OHIO COURTS SUMMARY 1992 1E, IF, 1H
("in the general division of the courts of common pleas in the state, only 20 cases were referred
for private judging; in the domestic relations division, 42 cases were referred for private
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private judges increased substantially. The general division of the
courts of common pleas in the state saw a 340 percent increase; the
domestic relations division saw a 1,211.9 percent increase; and the
juvenile division saw a 300 percent increase in the number of cases
referred to private judges.24
Despite the increased use of Ohio's private-judging system, some
critics contend that there is simply no need for it because Ohio's court
system, they claim, is not overburdened. The statistics belie this
contention. Ohio is the seventh most populous state with a population
of approximately 11.5 million.25 More than 3.1 million cases were
filed in Ohio courts in 2005.26 Since 1995, the courts of common
pleas have seen dramatic increases in the number of filings. In the
general division, foreclosure filings have increased by 301 percent,
other civil filings by 57 percent, and criminal filings by 31 percent.27
In the domestic relations division, filings have increased by 273
percent.28 In the juvenile division, child support enforcement or
modification filings have increased by 60 percent. 29 Moreover, there
is substantial delay in the general division, including up to three years
for complex litigation.30
As Ohio's population continues to increase, so will the burden on
the court system. Filings will surge, delays will increase, and
confidence in the system will erode. Private judging offers an
alternative forum for litigants that can help to mitigate the burden on
the courts. Of course, private judging cannot solve this growing
problem that looms on the horizon. But presenting litigants with the
option of private judging, along with arbitration, mediation, and other
forms of alternative dispute resolution, will be integral in ensuring the
efficiency and legitimacy of Ohio courts.
judging; and in the juvenile division, only one case was referred for private judging.")).
24 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, OHIO COURTS SUMMARY 2005 at 27, 73, 135, available at
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/publications/annrep/05OCS [hereinafter 2005 OHIO SUMMARY]
(in the general division of the courts of common pleas in the state, 88 cases were referred for
private judging; in the domestic relations division, 551 cases were referred for private judging;
and in the juvenile division, 4 cases were referred for private judging).
25 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY QUICKFACTS, http://quickfacts.census.gov/
qfd/states/39000.htm1 (last visited Dec. 22, 2007).
26 Thomas J. Moyer, Introduction to 2005 OHIO SUMMARY, supra note 24.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 27.
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A. Ohio Revised Code § 2701.10: How It Works
Ohio Revised Code § 2701.10 authorizes any voluntarily-retired
judge to serve as a private judge. The retired judge must first register
with the clerk of any court of common pleas, municipal court, or
county court-there is no limitation upon the number, type, or
locations of courts with which the retired judge may register. Upon
registration, the retired judge is eligible to receive referrals for
adjudication of civil actions and submissions for determination of
specific issues or questions of fact or law in any civil action. Each
court is required to maintain and make available a roster of registered
private judges.31
Parties to any pending civil action may unanimously choose to
refer the action in its entirety, or submit any specific issue or question
of fact or law to a properly-registered private judge of their choosing.
If the parties unanimously choose to have a referral or submission
made to a private judge, they enter into a written agreement with the
private judge. The agreement must: (1) identify the private judge; (2)
indicate whether a referral or submission is to be made; (3) if a
submission is to be made, describe the specific issue or question to be
submitted; (4) indicate that the parties will provide and pay for the
necessary facilities, equipment, and personnel; and (5) identify the
amount of compensation the parties will pay to the private judge.32
31 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2701.10(A) (West 2007):
Any voluntarily retired judge, or any judge who is retired under Section 6 of Article
IV, Ohio Constitution, may register with the clerk of any court of common pleas,
municipal court, or county court for the purpose of receiving referrals for
adjudication of civil actions or proceedings, and submissions for determination of
specific issues or questions of fact or law in any civil action or proceeding, pending
in the court. There is no limitation upon the number, type, or location of courts with
which a retired judge may register under this division. Upon registration with the
clerk of any court under this division, the retired judge is eligible to receive referrals
and submissions from that court, in accordance with this section. Each court of
common pleas, municipal court, and county court shall maintain an index of all
retired judges who have registered with the clerk of that court pursuant to this
division and shall make the index available to any person, upon request.
(emphasis added).
32 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2701.10(B)(1):
The parties to any civil action or proceeding pending in any court of common pleas,
municipal court, or county court unanimously may choose to have the action or
proceeding in its entirety referred for adjudication, or to have any specific issue or
question of fact or law in the action or proceeding submitted for determination, to a
judge of their choosing who has registered with the clerk of that court in accordance
with division (A) of this section.
[Vol. 58:2
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The agreement is then filed with the clerk of the court or the
presiding judge in the case. The presiding judge orders the referral or
submission in accordance with the agreement.33 Upon the entry of the
presiding judge's order, the private judge assumes all of the powers,
duties, and authority of an active judge. The court is not required to
provide the private judge with a courtroom or any other facilities,
equipment, or personnel.34
If the parties unanimously do choose to have a referral or submission made to a
retired judge pursuant to this section, all of the parties to the action or proceeding
shall enter into a written agreement with the retired judge that does all of the
following:
(a) Designates the retired judge to whom the referral or submission is to
be made;
(b) Ifa submission is to be made, describes in detail the specific issue
or question to be submitted;
(c) Indicates either of the following:
(i) That the action or proceeding in its entirety is to be
referred to, and is to be tried, determined, and adjudicated by
that retired judge;
(ii) Indicates that the issue or question is to be submitted, and
is to be tried and determined by that retired judge.
(d) Indicates that the parties will assume the responsibility for
providing facilities, equipment, and personnel reasonably needed by the
retired judge during his consideration of the action or proceeding and will
pay all costs arising out of the provision of the facilities, equipment, and
personnel;
(e) Identifies an amount of compensation to be paid by the parties to the
retired judge for his services and the manner of payment of the
compensation.
33 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2701. 10(3)(2):
In any case described in division (B)(1) of this section, the agreement shall be filed
with the clerk of the court or the judge before who the action or proceeding is
pending. Upon the filing of the agreement, the judge before whom the action or
proceeding is pending, by journal entry, shall order the referral or submission in
accordance with the agreement. No referral or submission shall be made to a retired
judge under this section, unless the parties to the action or proceeding unanimously
choose to have the referral or submission made, enter into an agreement of the type
described in division (3)(1) of this section with the retired judge, and file the
agreement in accordance with this division.
3 O1IO REV. CODE ANN. §270 1.1 0(C):
Upon the entry of an order of referral or submission in accordance with division
(B)(2) of this section, the retired judge to whom the referral or submission is made,
relative to the action or proceeding referred or the issue or question submitted, shall
have all of the powers, duties, and authority of an active judge of the court in which
the action or proceeding is pending. The court in which the action or proceeding is
pending is not required to provide the retired judge with court or other facilities,
equipment, or personnel during his consideration of the action, proceeding, issue, or
question. The retired judge shall not receive any compensation, other than that
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A private judge to whom a referral is made tries all of the issues in
the action, prepares relevant findings of fact and conclusions of law,
and enters a judgment as if he were an active judge of the court. A
private judge to whom a submission is made tries the specific issue or
question submitted, prepares relevant findings of fact or conclusions
of law, makes a determination on the issue or question submitted, and
files the findings, conclusions, and determination with the clerk of the
court. The private judge's judgment, findings, conclusions, and
determinations have the same force and effect as if made by an active
judge. Any appeal is to be made as if the private judge were an active
judge of the court.35
B. Rule VI: The Supreme Court's Rules for the Government of the
Judiciary of Ohio
Rule V1 36 operates in conjunction with section 2701.10 to further
define the private-judging system. For instance, section 2701.10(A)
authorizes any "voluntarily retired judge" to register as a private
judge. Rule VI defines "voluntarily retired judge" as "any person who
was elected to and served on an Ohio court without being defeated in
an election for new or continued service on that court., 37 The
definition excludes any judge who: (1) has been removed or
suspended without reinstatement pursuant to the Supreme Court
Rules, (2) has resigned or retired from service while a complaint was
pending under the Supreme Court Rules, or (3) resigned from office
agreed to by the parties and the retired judge, for his services during his
consideration of the action, proceeding, issue, or question.
35 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2701.10(D):
A retired judge to whom a referral is made under this section shall try all of the
issues in the action or proceeding, shall prepare relevant findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and shall enter a judgment in the action or proceeding in the
same manner as if he were an active judge of the court. A retired judge to whom a
submission is made under this section shall try the specific issue or question
submitted, shall prepare relevant findings of fact or conclusions of law, shall make a
determination on the issue or question submitted, and shall file the findings,
conclusions, and determination with the clerk of the court in which the action or
proceeding is pending. Any judgment entered, and any finding of fact, conclusion of
law, or determination of an issue or question made, by a retired judge in accordance
with this section shall have the same force and effect as if it had been entered or
made by an active judge of the court, and any appeal from the judgment, finding,
conclusion, or determination shall be made as if the judgment had been entered, or
the finding, conclusion, or determination had been made, by an active judge of the
court.
36 OHIO Gov. JUD. R. VI.
37 OHIO Gov. JuD. R. VI § I (C)(2).
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between the date of defeat in an election for further service on that
court and the end of his or her term.38
Rule VI also specifies that the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure and
the Ohio Rules of Evidence apply to actions referred or issues
submitted to a private judge.39 Similarly, Rule VI requires private
judges to comply with the Code of Judicial Conduct.40
III. ADVANTAGES OF PRIVATE JUDGING
There are many advantages in choosing a private judge over
traditional litigation for the resolution of disputes: cost-efficiency,
tailored expertise, appellate review, privacy, convenience, and
reduced caseloads.
A. Cost-Efficiency
As previously mentioned, Ohio's congested civil docket can result
41in substantial delay for some litigants-up to three years. In
contrast, private judging provides the parties with immediate access
to the "courtroom." Private judges are not burdened with a backlog of
cases. 42 "[P]arties choosing to hire a [private judge] generally resolve
their cases much faster than those waiting for a place on the state
court docket.A 3 While traditional litigation is often fraught with
costly strategic maneuvering designed to delay and frustrate
opponents, private judging is imbued with a spirit of cooperation.44
This cooperative spirit promotes efficiency, saving both parties time
and money.45 Moreover, despite the fact that private judges charge a
substantial amount of compensation for their services, 46 "the
expedition, sharp focus and practiced informality of private judging
virtually guarantees smaller total cost in the privately judged
proceeding." 47 As one participant concluded, "[Using a private judge]
has saved 80% of the delays, 80% of the legal fees and 80% of the
aggravation.A
8
38 Id.
39 OHio Gov. JuD. R. VI § 3(A).
40 OHIo Gov. JUD. R. VI § 4(B).
41 See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
42 Note, The California Rent-a-Judge Experiment: Constitutional and Policy
Considerations of Pay-As-You-Go Courts, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1592, 1599 (1981).
43 Id.
44 CHERNICK, BENDIX & BARREIr, supra note 7, at 30.
45 Id.
46 A well-regarded private judge can demand an hourly rate comparable to that of a senior
litigation counsel. Christian, supra note 18, at 6.
47 Id.
48 Eric D. Green, Avoiding the Legal Logjam-Private Justice, California Style, in CORP.
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B. Tailored Expertise
Private judging enables parties to select a judge who has the
necessary experience and expertise to try the particular issues of their
case. Parties to cases involving "intricate intellectual property issues,
arcane accounting principles, or other issues requiring special
expertise" are best served when they don't have to explain the
rudiments of the issues to the judge.49 As Winslow Christian explains
in his chapter on "Private Judging":
Litigation counsel are aware of the critical influence on the
trial outcome of the judge's experience, professional capacity
and personal value system. In the public courts these factors
must usually be left to fate; in private judging the parties, if
they share an interest in going before a judge with particular
qualifications, can with great assurance and precision choose
an appropriate judge.5 °
Selecting a private judge who is an expert in the subject matter and
law of the dispute not only allows the parties to save time and money,
but also legitimizes the proceedings and instills confidence in the
outcome.
C. Appellate Review
One important advantage of private judging that distinguishes it
from all other alternative-dispute-resolution processes is that the
outcome is subject to appellate review in the traditional court system.
"Arbitration findings, in contrast, are final unless there has been some
corruption in the arbitration proceeding itself."51 Since corporate and
other sophisticated clients may be reluctant to subject important cases
to the virtually-unreviewable discretion of arbitrators, private judging
provides a unique alternative that preserves the right to appeal.
Disp. MGMT. 65, 71 (1982).
49 Bendix & Chemick, supra note 4, at 34.
50 Christian, supra note 18, at 5 (emphasis in original).
5' Note, supra note 42, at 1600; see also Haynes, supra note 4, at 621 ("An arbitrator's
award, unless fraudulently obtained, is final and not appealable, and cannot be enforced until a
separate legal action has been filed. In contrast, the private judge's decision is appealable, and
corresponds exactly to a traditional civil judgment. For these reasons, private judging is more
akin to the traditional courts than to arbitration.").
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D. Convenience
The flexibility in scheduling that private judging provides is
another advantage of the system. Indeed, private judges are "highly
responsive to the needs of counsel. 52 Parties determine the time and
place of the proceeding. To accommodate scheduling needs, hearings
can be held at night or over the weekend.53 Moreover, if no mutually
convenient location can be identified, the proceedings can be
conducted over the phone.5 4 The convenience and flexibility of
private judging stands in stark contrast to the formal rigidity of the
traditional litigation system.
E. Privacy
In some states, a privately-judged proceeding can remain
"confidential until a judgment is rendered. 55 Confidentiality can be
an advantage to both individuals and businesses alike. Private judging
can enable parties to prevent "damaging or embarrassing business or
personal behavior" from becoming fodder within the public domain.
5 6
F. Reduced Caseloads
Private judging helps to provide relief from overcrowding in the
courts. The effectiveness of the system in reducing caseloads in the
public courts will continue to improve "if the quality of private
judging is maintained and the creativity of its processes is enhanced
by trained and experienced neutrals. 57 Private judging, when used in
conjunction with other kinds of private dispute resolution, such as
mediation and arbitration, will continue to have an increasingly
powerful impact by resolving cases that would otherwise remain in
the public court system. Thus, private judging benefits not just the
private litigants who choose to use the system, but also the traditional
court system as a whole, and any public litigants with pending
actions.
52 Christian, supra note 18, at 6.
53 Note, supra note 42, at 1599.
54 CHERNICK, BENDIX & BARRETr, supra note 7, at 30.
55 Christian, supra note 18, at 6.
56 David J. Shapiro, Private Judging in the State of New York: A Critical Introduction, 23
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 275, 291 (1990).
57 CHERNICK, BENDIX & BARRETr, supra note 7, at 34.
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IV. CONCERNS OVER PRIVATE JUDGING
Although the advantages of private judging are numerous, the
system is not without its critics. These critics allege that it creates a
(1) a two-tiered system of justice, (2) in which the presiding officials
are beholden to repeat customers, (3) the proceedings are cloaked in
secrecy, (4) the promise of astronomical hourly rates lures the most
talented judges away from the traditional bench, and (5) the parties
bypass the traditional system in order to gain priority access to
appellate courts. But the empirical evidence generally does not
support the public policy concerns or the constitutional challenges to
the system. Moreover, "some of these concerns apply to all forms of
[alternative dispute resolution], which generally have been
supported-indeed encouraged-by practitioners, consumers of legal
services, and legislatures. 58
A. A Two-Tiered System: Rich v. Poor
Private judges "generally cost between $300 to $500 an hour,
though some popular judges command per diem fees of up to
$5000."" Critics contend that private judging creates a dual system of
justice populated by two classes of litigants: comparatively affluent
litigants, who can afford to pay the exorbitant costs, and poorer
litigants, who cannot.60 For example, those litigants who are
appearing pro se, using legal aid, or generally dependent upon a
judgment to cover litigation costs are allegedly unable to hire a
private judge. 61 Thus, because "the non-affluent are ostensibly
excluded, ' 62 critics of the system condemn private judging as bad
public policy that violates both the Due Process and the Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
1. Public Policy Concerns
If the system did in fact create a dual-justice system there would
be cause for concern. But private judging is not only for the rich. In
fact, "private judging and other ADR techniques may be the only
cost-effective dispute resolution forum for litigants with limited
means. ' 63 Many privately-judged proceedings involve personal injuryor domestic relations disputes where the amount in controversy is
58 Id.
59 Kim, supra note 16, at 175.
60 Note, supra note 41, at 1601.
61 Id.
62 Haynes, supra note 4, at 622.
63 CHERNICK, BENDIX & BARRETt, supra note 7, at 35.
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below fifty-thousand dollars. 64 One participating private judge noted
that among those who use system, "the rich are in a great minority.
The average litigant is a typical middle class business man, typical
middle person ...people who want to get their matters heard.,
65
Moreover, in the traditional system, wealthy litigants benefit from
procedures and services not available to other litigants of lesser
means. For example, a wealthy litigant can afford to retain a high-
priced trial lawyer whose skill is arguably commensurate with the
hourly rate, and the availability of federal courts in diversity cases is
limited to cases in which the amount in controversy is at least
seventy-five thousand dollars. "[P]rivate judging at least presents the
possibility of agreed cost-shifting, which may aid the underfinanced
party., 66 Thus, because litigants of lesser means are capable of
benefiting from privately-judged proceedings, it does not create a
dual system of justice.
2. Procedural Due Process Concerns
Even if privately-judged proceedings were unavailable to the
comparatively non-affluent, the system would not violate
constitutional due process. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the
Due Process Clause requires, at a minimum, that a state "afford to all
individuals a meaningful opportunity to be heard., 67 Individuals,
whether affluent or non-affluent, simply do not have a fundamental
"right of access to any particular forum unless no other recognized,
,,68
effective forum exists. Private judging provides an auxiliary forum
to the traditional courts. Other effective alternatives include
arbitration, mediation, and small claims court. Providing the public
with a choice of forums does not inhibit an indigent person's
opportunity to be heard. "The poor, just like the wealthy, have an
opportunity to assert their rights in a meaningful hearing outside the
private judging forum., 69 Therefore, private judging does not violate
the due process rights of poor litigants.
4 Id. In Ohio, domestic relations disputes comprise roughly eighty percent of privately-
judged cases. 2005 OHIO SUMMARY, supra note 24, at 27, 73, 135, 186, 249.
65 CHERNICK, BENDIX & BARRETT, supra note 7, at 36.
SId.
67 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971).
6 Haynes, supra note 4, at 629-30.
69 Janet D. Longsworth, Private Judging: An Effective and Efficient Alternative to the
Traditional Court System, 21 VAL. U. L. REv. 681,696 (1987).
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3. Equal Protection Concerns
Even if private judges were only available to the comparatively
affluent, the system would not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause protects
against invidious discrimination with respect to classifications based
on race,7° national origin,7' alienage,72 gender,73 and illegitimacy.74
Courts have developed three different tiers of scrutiny to analyze
whether state and federal laws violate equal protection: (1) strict
scrutiny, (2) intermediate scrutiny, and (3) rational basis. Strict
scrutiny is the most difficult standard of review. It requires that the
state law be necessary to achieve a compelling governmental
interest.75 Classifications that (1) disadvantage a suspect class or (2)
violate the exercise of a fundamental right command strict scrutiny
and are "treated as presumptively invidious. 76 Private judging
involves neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right. First, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that wealth is not a suspect
classification.77 Second, the Supreme Court has never recognized a
fundamental right of access to the civil courts.78 Thus, strict scrutiny
cannot be invoked.
On the standard-of-review spectrum, intermediate scrutiny lies
between strict scrutiny and rational basis. It is generally applied to
legislative classifications based on gender,79  illegitimacy, 0  and
70 Washington v. Davies, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
71 See, e.g., Hemandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886).
72 See, e.g., Examining Bd. of Eng'rs v. De Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
73 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976).
74 See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
75 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312, 322 (1980).
76 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982).
'n See, e.g., McRae, 448 U.S. at 323 (holding that wealth is not a suspect classification
under the Hyde Amendment); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977) (holding that the denial
of benefits to welfare recipients need not invoke strict scrutiny); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973) (holding that wealth is not a suspect classification with
regards to public education); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (holding that
rationality review is sufficient for determining the maximum amount of benefits allowed for
welfare recipients).
78 See, e.g., Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (upholding a mandatory state-
imposed twenty-five-dollar filing fee for review of welfare benefit termination); United States v.
Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446 (1973) (upholding mandatory state-imposed filing fees for bankruptcy);
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382 (1971) (striking down a state-imposed filing fee in a
divorce action, but refusing to recognize a general right of access to the courts). See also Note,
supra note 42, at 1603 n.57 (discussing that a right to access to the civil courts is case-specific).
79 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S 190 (1976).
80 Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 519-20 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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alienage. 81  This heightened review standard requires such
classifications to be substantially related to the achievement of
important governmental objectives.82 The Supreme Court has never
afforded the poor the protection of this intermediate standard of
review. g3 Thus, private judging cannot invoke intermediate scrutiny.
Since private judging does not qualify for review under either
strict or intermediate scrutiny, it need only meet the minimal demands
of rational basis review. Most classifications will survive this form of
scrutiny. Indeed, courts will presume the legislative classification's
validity. 84 Under rational basis, "the legislative classification must be
sustained if the classification itself is rationally related to a legitimate
governmental interest.
85
The legitimate governmental interest that private-judging statutes
seek to achieve is the reduction of congestion and delay in the
traditional court system. Providing this auxiliary forum benefits not
only those parties who remove their cases to private judges, but also
traditional court system litigants; parties who choose to remain in the
public system, or are unable to afford the private system, experience
less delay and receive more efficient service as an indirect result of
private judging. Moreover, because the private-judging system is self-
supporting, the private-payment requirement is an economic
necessity. The system simply could not exist without private
payments unless the state siphoned funds away from the traditional
81 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
82 Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
83 See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977) ("[Tlhis Court has never held that financial
need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis."); Longsworth,
supra note 69, at 701 (arguing that the existence of social and welfare legislation negates a
claim that the class comprised of the poor needs the active judicial intervention provided by
intermediate scrutiny). On the issue of the utility of poverty as a suspect class, see JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 162 (1980) ("What
typically disadvantage the poor are various failures on the part of the government (or anybody
else) to alleviate their poverty by providing one or another good or service. . . .However,
failures to provide the poor with one or another good or service, insensitive as they may often
seem to some of us, do not generally result from a sadistic desire to keep the miserable in their
state of misery, or a stereotypical generalization about their characteristics, but rather from a
reluctance to raise the taxes needed to support such expenditures-and at all events they will be
susceptible to immediate translation into such constitutionally innocent terms. A theory of
suspicious classification will thus be of only occasional assistance to the poor, since their
problems are not often problems of classification to begin with."). But see Note, supra note 42,
at 1604 (arguing that poverty, in conjunction with other factors, such as the right to resort to law
to enforce or protect one's rights, should entitle poorer litigants to intermediate scrutiny).
84 See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976).
85 Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 639 (1986); see also Cent. State Univ. v. Am. Ass'n of
Univ. Professors, 526 U.S. 124, 127-28 (1999) ("We have repeatedly held that a classification
neither involving fundamental rights nor proceedings along suspect lines cannot run afoul of the
Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between disparity of treatment and
some legitimate governmental purpose.") (internal quotation omitted).
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system-thereby defeating the burden-easing purpose of private
judging. Thus, because a self-supporting private-judging system is a
rational means of reducing court congestion and delay, it does not
violate equal protection.
B. Conflicts of Interest
Another criticism of privately-judged proceedings focuses on the
potential for the private payment to compromise the judge's
impartiality. s6 The concern is that private judges will favor a
particular party in order to secure or maintain that party as a "steady
customer." 87 The steady customer would most likely be a wealthy
individual or corporation with the means and opportunity to supply a
steady flow of business to the judge. Allegedly, the judge "would find
it in his self interest to favor these parties where possible.,
88
The available evidence suggests that privately-judged proceedings
are "widely seen to be fair and untainted by bias or conflicts of
interest. ' 89 In Ohio, private judges are required to comply with the
Code of Judicial Conduct. Canon 3 of that Code requires judges to
perform judicial duties impartially, without bias or prejudice. 90
Moreover, the consent requirement will largely neutralize the bias
concern, so long as both parties have equal and adequate knowledge
about the judge. Of course, when a "repeat player" is matched against
a "one-time customer," the balance of knowledge is tilted.9 This
imbalance creates an opportunity for abuse. But the balance can be
restored. A database of available private judges could be made
available to potential private litigants. The database could include a
curriculum vitae, organizational affiliations, and a list of the litigating
parties in all past decisions. This information would help to avoid
conflicts of interest. It would also facilitate the selection of a judge
with experience and expertise well-suited to the dispute.
C. Secrecy
One of the most appealing aspects of private judging, the secret
nature of the proceedings, is simultaneously the source of much
86 Note, supra note 42, at 1607.
87 Id. at 1608.
88 Id. ("Of course, any favoritism could not be overt, for then the opponents of the steady
customers would refuse to consent. But over time, referees could safely give steady customers
the benefit of the doubt more often than not.").
89 CHERNICK, BENDIX & BARRETr, supra note 7, at 40.
90 OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(5) (2006), available at
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rules/conduct.
91 Note, supra note 42, at 1608.
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concern. Closed trials enable parties to prevent critical private
information, such as trade secrets, sensitive financial data, and
embarrassing personal details, from seeping into the public domain.92
The public is not notified of the time or place of the private hearing,
the private judge does not publish an opinion, and the court reporter's
record will not be transcribed or filed unless the parties appeal.93
Some critics contend that the secrecy of these proceedings violates
"the public's basic [F]irst [A]mendment right to scrutinize the
workings of governmental institutions. 94
The First Amendment, in conjunction with the Fourteenth,
prohibits governments from "abridging the freedom of speech., 95 But
that freedom is not limited to speech alone. The First Amendment
freedoms combine to promote a "common core purpose of assuring
freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of
government., 96 This so-called "right to know" is founded upon the
principle that "if an individual has the right to speak, there must be a
concomitant right to listen; otherwise the freedom to speak would be
meaningless. The freedom to listen implies the freedom to know.
97
Critics claim that the secret nature of private judging violates the First
Amendment.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized this "right to
know" reasoning -in the context of criminal trials. In Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,98 the trial court, in a murder trial,
ordered the exclusion of the press and public from the courtroom,
pursuant to a state statute. A newspaper petitioned the state supreme
court for writs of mandamus and prohibition and filed an appeal, but
the court dismissed the petitions and denied the appeal. The United
States Supreme Court reversed and held that the First Amendment
protects the right of press and public to attend criminal trials.99 The
Court emphasized that "it would be difficult to single out any aspect
of government of higher concern and importance to the people than
92 Haynes, supra note 4, at 646-47 (arguing that negotiation, arbitration, and mediation
are more appropriate means of preventing public disclosure of critical private information in
light of the public interest in open trials).
93 Id. at 640-4 1.
9 Note, supra note 42, at 1609.
95 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.").
96 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980).
97 Shapiro, supra note 56, at 306.
98 448 U.S. 555 (plurality opinion).
99 Id. at 580.
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the manner in which criminal trials are conducted."' 00 The plurality
opinion in Richmond specifically noted that the holding did not apply
to civil cases. 101 Moreover, when the Court reaffirmed the Richmond
decision in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,10 2 it did not
choose to extend its application beyond the realm of criminal trials.
Justice O'Connor emphasized that "neither Richmond Newspapers
nor the Court's decision today ... carry any implications outside the
context of criminal trials.'0 3
Of course, just because the holdings in these cases are limited to
the context of criminal trials, does not imply that there is no right of
access to civil proceedings. But it seems unlikely that the Court
would extend an unlimited right of access to civil proceedings. Such a
holding would have an immediate and drastic effect on the entire
spectrum of alternative dispute resolution. Moreover, the concept of a
right of access to civil proceedings seems misplaced and unnecessary
given that civil interests are ordinarily less severe than criminal
interests. Because the Supreme Court has never extended the
constitutional right of access to civil cases, there is no Supreme Court
precedent supporting a First Amendment attack on private judging.
Critics of private judging may, however, find support for the right
of public access to civil court proceedings in another body of
constitutional doctrine-state constitutions. Twenty-five states have
explicit "open court" provisions in their constitutions.'0 4 In Ohio, the
"open courts" provision states, in pertinent part, "All courts shall be
open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods,
person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and
shall have justice administered without denial or delay.' ', 0 5 This
expansive language seems to give strong support to a right of access
to civil court proceedings. But in In re T.R.,' °6 the Ohio Supreme
Court concluded that "the open courts provision of the Ohio
Constitution creates no greater right of public access to court
proceedings than that accorded by the Free Speech and Free Press
Rights Clauses of the First Amendment to the United States
,0 Id. at 575 (emphasis added).
10 Id. at 580 n.17 ("Whether the public has a right to attend trials of civil cases is a
question not raised by this case, but we note that historically both civil and criminal trials have
been presumptively open.").
02457 U.S. 596 (1982).
103Id at 611 (concurring opinion).
104 Jack B. Harrison, How Open Is Open? The Development of the Public Access Doctrine
Under State Open Court Provisions, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 1307, 1307 (1992).
I03 OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 16 (emphasis added).
16 556 N.E.2d 439 (Ohio 1990).
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Constitution."' 0 7 Thus, it remains unclear whether the "open courts"
provision of the Ohio Constitution or the First Amendment right of
public access to court proceedings would apply, generally, to civil
cases and, specifically, to privately judged proceedings.
D. Brain Drain
Another criticism of private judging is that the promise of high
compensation will lure the most talented judges away from the public
bench and into early retirement. If there were an exodus of the most
talented judges as a result of the private-judging system, it would be a
very serious concern. But there is no evidence to support that concern.
To the contrary, one study found that, "[d]ata from the survey of
retired judges gives no support to the idea that more judges are
retiring early to do private judging."'0 8 It might be that the intangible
emoluments of the bench, such as prestige, status, power, and
independence override whatever monetary gains exist in the private
sector. 0 9 Moreover, the lure of higher compensation in private
practice existed long before private judging. "Retention of valued
public servants should be achieved by offering appropriate job
conditions, benefits, and compensation"-not by scapegoating "a
service which is beneficial to and desired by litigants. ' 10
E. Priority Access to Appellate Courts
Private judging is occasionally criticized for enabling litigants to
leapfrog the congested trial courts in order to gain priority access to
the appellate courts. Some have suggested that wealthy litigants might
exploit the expedited alternative path to establish precedent sooner.
This criticism is highly implausible. To realize this conspiracy theory,
a private litigant would have to bring an action before a private judge,
intentionally lose, and then appeal to the appellate court in order to
secure common law precedent.' As one observer commented,
"[e]ven if a group of litigants wanted to distort the judicial process in
this way, the pragmatic difficulties of such an unlikely scheme would
107 Id. at 448.
108 JANICE A. ROEHL, ROBERT E. HUITr & HENRY WONG, PRIVATE JUDGING: A STUDY OF
ITS VOLUME, NATURE, AND IMPACT ON STATE COURTS 34 (Final Report 1993).
1° See Jonathan L. Entin & Erik M. Jensen, Taxation, Compensation, and Judicial
Independence, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965, 1001-09 (2006) (arguing that, despite Supreme
Court endorsement, recruitment is not a purpose of the Compensation Clause). Indeed, "to
attract good men to and to secure efficiency, the honour and independence of the office are of
far greater account than the emoluments that attach to it." Id. at 1007 (quoting CHARLES EVANS
HUGHES, CONDITIONS OF PROGRESS IN DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 49 (1910)).
110 CHERNICK, BENDIX & BARRETT, supra note 7, at 45.
' Shapiro, supra note 56, at 310.
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either greatly hamper their progress or make it virtually
impossible."' 12
F. Non-Availability of Trial by Jury
Some might list the non-availability of jury trials in privately-
judged proceedings as a downside of the system. Indeed, some
jurisdictions explicitly prohibit private judges from conducting jury
trials.1 13 Colorado expressly authorizes privately-judged jury trials.1 14
In Ohio, section 2701.10 does not expressly authorize or prohibit jury
trials in privately-judged proceedings; nevertheless, private judges
had been conducting jury trials prior to the 2006 case of Russo v.
McDonnell, 115 which brought the issue to a head.
V. RUSSO v. MCDONNELL
Under Rule 4(B) of the Rules of Superintendence for the Court of
Ohio, "the administrative judge has 'full responsibility and control
over the administration, docket, and calendar of the court or division'
and is 'responsible to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in the
discharge of his or her duties.""' 16 Pursuant to this authority, the
administrative judge of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common
Pleas, Richard J. McMonagle, implemented a policy entitled "Court
Policy Regarding Private Judging."'"17 The policy "specif[ied] that
'jury trials will be permitted with private judges.""'1 8 As a result of
this policy, private judges were conducting jury trials in Cuyahoga
County prior to Russo.
In Russo v. McDonnell, 852 N.E.2d 145 (2006), the Ohio Supreme
Court held that jury trials were not permitted in privately-judged
proceedings." 9 In so doing, the court recognized that "[a]s court
112 1d. at 310-11.
13 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 33-38-10-4(a) (2007) ("A trial conducted by a private
judge shall be conducted without a jury."); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 151.002(2)
(Vernon 2007) (Each party to an action seeking referral to a special judge must file a motion
that "waives the party's right to a trial by jury.").
114 COLO. R. Civ. P. 122.
11 852 N.E.2d 145 (Ohio 2006).
1161d. at 147 (quoting OHIO SUP. CT. R. 4(B)).
117 Id.
l8ld.; see also Relator's Memorandum in Support of Verified Complaint for Writ of
Prohibition and Alternative Writ of Prohibition at A-8, Russo, 852 N.E.2d 145 (No. 05-2130)
("Inasmuch as O.R.C. § 2701.10 is a matter of legislative action, the Policy Committee will not
and cannot change the wording of that legislation. The Committee voted by a majority, with
some dissent, that jury trials will be permitted with private judges.").
S'9Russo, 852 N.E.2d at 154 ("[W]e conclude that the administrative judge patently and
unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to compel or facilitate jury trials for civil actions or issues
submitted to a retired judge pursuant to R.C. 2701.10. Accordingly, a peremptory writ of
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dockets grow more crowded and litigation costs more expensive,
methods of alternative dispute resolution should be encouraged.'
120
The court went on to say that the Ohio General Assembly, and not the
court, was the proper body to resolve public policy issues. 12'
The dispute in Russo grew out of Peffer v. Cleveland Clinic
Foundation. 122 In Peffer, the parties entered into an agreement to refer
the medical malpractice case in its entirety to a private judge,
pursuant to section 2701.10. The Cuyahoga County Court of
Common Pleas judge assigned to that case, Nancy Margaret Russo,
refused to refer the case to the private judge. After Russo's refusal,
the administrative judge, Richard J. McMonagle, ordered the referral
to retired judge Peggy Foley Jones under section 2701.10 for the case
to proceed to jury trial. McMonagle further specified that Russo no
longer had any jurisdiction over the matter and had not since July 15,
2005, the date on which the parties filed the referral agreement.
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Ohio
granted the plaintiffs in Peffer a writ of prohibition to prevent Russo
from proceeding in the case. The court determined that Russo was
without power to act further on the case because McMonagle's orders
had "unambiguously terminated" her authority. 23 However, the court
did not determine whether section 2701.10 authorized private judges
to conduct jury trials.
At this time there were several other cases in the Cuyahoga County
Common Pleas Court in which the parties agreed to refer the case to a
retired judge for a jury trial under section 2701.10.124 One such case
was Austin v. Metrohealth Medical Center.125 In this case, "Judge
[John D.] Sutula refused to refer the case, based on his belief that
[section] 2701.10 does not authorize jury trials."' 26 Then, "[o]n
November 23, 2005, the court of appeals [for the Eighth District]
dismissed the complaint because '[section] 2701.10 and [the
applicable judicial rules] do not contain any reference to a jury trial'
prohibition is warranted to prevent the administrative judge from facilitating conduct of jury
trials in connection with R.C. 2701.10 cases.").
1
20Id. at 155 (quoting Colegrove v. Handler, 517 N.E.2d 979, 983 (Ohio 1986)).
121 Id.
122id. at 147 ("Relator is the judge assigned in Peffer v. Cleveland Clinic Found.,
Cuyahoga C.P. case No. CV-03-496855.").
123 Id. at 148 (quoting State ex rel. Peffer v. Russo, Cuyahoga App. No. 87149, 2005-Ohio-
5556, 2005 WL 2698574, 4).
124 Id.
125 Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-04-538701.
126 Russo, 852 N.E.2d at 148.
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and it could 'find no reference to the ability of a voluntarily retired
judge to conduct a jury trial." 127
"On November 14, 2005, [Russo] filed [an] action for a writ of
prohibition to prevent the administrative judge [McMonagle] from
'compelling or facilitating jury trials in proceedings purportedly
submitted or referred' under [section] 2701.10. [Russo] also requested
a writ of prohibition to prevent [McMonagle] from 'directing or
permitting the use of facilities, equipment, resources, utilities and/or
personnel of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas in any
proceedings' under [section] 2701.1 o:9128
"In order to be entitled to the requested extraordinary relief in
prohibition, [Russo had to] establish that (1) the administrative judge
[was] about to exercise judicial power, (2) the exercise of this power
[was] not authorized by law, and (3) denial of the writ [would] cause
injury for which no other adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law exist[ed].', 129 The administrative judge did not dispute the fact
that he was exercising judicial power. 130 The case centered around the
second writ requirement-whether the exercise of power was
authorized by law. "If a lower court patently and unambiguously
lacks jurisdiction to proceed in a cause, prohibition will issue to
prevent any future unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction and to correct
the results of prior jurisdictionally unauthorized actions."031
Moreover, if Russo could establish that McMonagle's exercise of
power represented "a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction,"
then she would not have to prove the third writ requirement-lack of
an adequate remedy of law-"because the availability of alternate
remedies like appeal would be immaterial."'
132
The court found that "the administrative judge patently and
unambiguously lack[ed] jurisdiction to compel or facilitate jury trials
for civil actions or issues submitted to a retired judge pursuant to
section 2701.10. Accordingly," it determined, "a peremptory writ of
prohibition [was] warranted to prevent the administrative judge from
[conducting] jury trials in connection with section 2701.10 cases."'' 33
1271d. at 148 (quoting State ex rel. MetroHealth Med. Ctr. v. Sutula, Cuyahoga App. No.
87184, 2005-Ohio-6243, 2005 WL 3120209, 8, 10).
1281d. at 148-49. On January 5, 2006, the Ohio Supreme Court received notification that
Judge Nancy R. McDonnell had succeeded Judge McMonagle as the administrative judge of the
common pleas court. Id. at 149. "Pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. X(2) and Civ.R. 25(D)(1), Judge
McDonnell [was] automatically substituted as the respondent in [the] case." Id.
1291d. at 149.
130 Id.
3 Id at 147 (citing State ex rel. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc. v. Henson, 810 N.E.2d 953,
14 (Ohio 2004)) (internal quotation omitted).
132 d. at 149 (citing State ex rel. Morenz v. Kerr, 818 N.E.2d 1162 (Ohio 2004)).
133Id. at 154.
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However, the court concluded that a peremptory writ was not
warranted to prevent the use of court resources for non-jury trials in
connection with section 2701.10 cases. Thus, "in matters referred to
private judges ...the court in which the action or proceeding is
pending is not required to provide the retired judge with court or other
facilities, equipment, or personnel, but may in its discretion do so if
the parties assume the responsibility and pay for all costs arising out
of the provision of the facilities, equipment, and personnel.'
' 34
The Ohio Supreme Court premised its decision on four bases.
First, the court held that both section 2701.10 and Rule VI require
bench trials. "Neither the statute nor the rule provides for or mentions
the conduct of a jury trial or contemplates a verdict to be returned by
a jury.' 35 After construing the statute to determine the paramount
consideration of legislative intent, the court found that the plain
language of section 2701.10(B)(1) requires the parties and the retired
judge to expressly agree that the referred matter shall be "tried,
determined, and adjudicated by that retired judge."'136 Furthermore,
section 2701.10(D) specifies that a "retired judge to whom a referral
is made under this section shall try all of the issues of the action or
proceeding, shall prepare relevant findings of fact and conclusions of
law, and shall enter a judgment in the action or proceeding in the
same manner as if he were an active judge of the court."' 13 7 In
addition, Rule VI provides that the retired judge must issue a pretrial
order of the "issues to be decided by the judge," that at the conclusion
of the trial, "[t]hejudge shall decide the case promptly," and that the
judge's written decision must contain separate findings of fact and
conclusions of law."'
138
Second, the court noted that the General Assembly omitted any
mention of jury trials in matters referred or submitted to a private
judge in accordance with section 2701.10 and Rule VI and
specifically required that these proceedings be tried and decided by
the judge. 139 In so doing, the court recognized and reiterated the
principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius-the expression of
one thing implies the exclusion of another.1
4 0
Third, the court determined that when the General Assembly has
intended for cases to be tried by jury, it has explicitly "manifested its
13Id.
135Id. at 151.
136d at 150 (emphasis omitted).
137 Id.
138Id. (quoting Gov. JuD. R. VI(3)(B)(1), (C), (D)) (emphasis in original).
139Id. at 151-52.
14d at 152.
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intent with appropriate language."' 14 1 Because "[n]o comparable
language appears in either [section] 2701.10 or [Rule] VI," the court
refused to interpret the statute in a way that would, essentially, add
words that are not present in the text.
1 42
Finally, the court rejected the argument that because section
2701.10(D) does not expressly mention the right to a jury trial, it is
impermissible for the statute to abrogate the right to jury trial
preserved by Article I, section 5 of the Ohio Constitution. The court
explained that "there is no right to a jury trial [ ] unless that right is
extended by statute or existed at common law prior to the adoption of
the Ohio Constitution."'' 43 Thus, there is no right to a jury trial in
matters referred or submitted to a private judge because neither the
statute nor the rule extend that right, "[n]or was there ever any
common-law right to a jury trial in cases referred to private judges
from the regular court docket."' 44 Furthermore, article I, section 5 of
the Ohio Constitution "does not prevent a court from giving effect to
a waiver of a jury trial by a party who has a right to a jury trial."'145
The court determined that, just as with other alternative dispute-
resolution techniques, parties that refer a case to a private judge
"manifestly waive their right to a jury trial."' 146
The sole dissenter, Justice Pfeifer, characterized the majority's
opinion as "plausible" but observed that section 2701.10 does not
directly prohibit private judges from using juries. 47 Once the parties
agree to refer a case, the private judge is statutorily empowered to
exercise "all of the powers, duties and authority of an active judge of
the court in which the action or proceeding is pending.' '148 Justice
Pfeifer noted that the powers, duties and authority of an active judge
include the ability to use Civil Rule 39(C). Civil Rule 39(C) states
that "[i]n all actions not triable of right by a jury (1) the court upon
motion or on its own initiative may try any issue with an advisory
jury or (2) the court, with the consent of both parties, may order a trial
of any issue with a jury, whose verdict has the same effect as if trial
by jury had been a matter of right."'149 Justice Pfeifer concluded that,
even if a referred case requires a bench trial and is an action "not
triable of right by a jury," as the majority contended, the private judge
1
4
1 Id.
1421d at 152, 153.
143Id. at 153.
I4Id.
45Id. (quoting Shimko v. Lobe, 813 N.E.2d 669 (Ohio 2004)).
16Id. at 154.147 d. at 155 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
1l4 d (quoting OHiO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2701.10(C) (West 2007)).
149 Id.
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in a referred case nevertheless has the ability, pursuant to Civil Rule
39(C), to "try any issues with an advisory jury" or, "with the consent
of both parties, [to] order a trial of any issue with a jury."15
Justice Pfeifer also noted that the General Assembly failed to make
any plain statement that can be construed as "abrogating or otherwise
affecting the [inviolate] right to a jury trial."'151 Article I, section 5 of
the Ohio Constitution and Civil Rule 38(A) both preserve this
inviolate right. 52 According to Pfeifer, the court "should not interpret
a statute to infringe an inviolate right absent plain and clear language
from the General Assembly that it intends to do so.'
' 53
Regardless of the opposing statutory interpretations employed in
both the majority and dissenting opinions, the fact remains that
whether private judges should be authorized to conduct jury trials is a
question of public policy-not statutory interpretation. The General
Assembly did not directly manifest its intent with plain, unambiguous
language. As a result, the Ohio Supreme Court was left to resolve a
public policy issue with the blunt instrument of statutory
interpretation. As the proper body to resolve public policy issues, the
General Assembly should accept the court's invitation to resolve this
public policy issue by amending the text of section 2701.10 to
authorize private judges to conduct jury trials.
VI. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF PRIVATELY-JUDGED JURY TRIALS
The primary advantage of a jury trial is realized through each
individual juror's ability to bring average common sense to bear upon
the facts. By constantly bringing the rules of the law to the
"touchstone of common sense," the jury makes the law intelligible.5 4
Moreover, "there is much evidence that most people, once actually
serving in a trial, become highly serious and responsible toward their
task and toward the joint effort to deliberate through to a verdict."'' 55
But some commentators criticize the civil jury. "The arguments
against the civil jury can be grouped into three basic categories: delay
caused by the use of juries, juror incompetence, and juror
prejudice."'' 56 Recently, "particular attention has been paid . . . to
150 Id.
1511Id.
152 OHIO CONST. art. I, § 5 ("The right of trial by jury shall be inviolate .... "); OHIO CIV.
R. 38(A) ("The right to trial by jury shall be preserved to the parties inviolate.").
153 Russo, 852 N.E. at 155 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
15 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTh, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 349-50 (6th ed. 1938).
155 Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1062 (1964).
'- RICHARD L. MARCUS, MARTIN H. REDISH & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, CIVIL PROCEDURE:
A MODERN APPROACH 530 (4th ed. 2005).
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problems that may arise from the use of juries in cases that are highly
complex, either legally or factually."'
' 57
In jurisdictions that permit private judges to conduct jury trials, a
privately-judged jury trial provides litigants with a unique means
through which to resolve their dispute. It combines the many
advantages of private judging with the commonsensical diligence of
the civil jury. For example, suppose party A sues corporation B.
Corporation B wants to remove the dispute from the traditional courts
for an alternative resolution, but insists on maintaining its right to
appeal the outcome. Party A's financial situation is precarious-she
desires a quick resolution to the dispute as well, but is concerned that
the moral or emotional strength of her arguments will be overlooked
if there is no jury to imbue humanity into what she perceives to be a
cold and calculating process. In this situation, a privately-judged jury
trial would fulfill the needs of both parties.
Of course, the benefits of the civil jury do not come without a cost
to the private-judging system. Indeed, in a privately-judged jury trial,
four of the advantages of the private-judging system are diminished:
(1) cost-efficiency, (2) tailored expertise, (3) privacy, and (4)
convenience. First, the additional time and money spent on the civil
jury reduces the cost-efficient nature of the proceeding. But because
the statutory fee that the parties must pay the jurors is minimal, the
proceeding will most likely retain most of its cost-efficiency. Second,
the civil jury diminishes the benefit of submitting complex technical
issues to a private judge with relevant expertise. But the private
judge's expertise should still be effective in streamlining the process
and helping the jury to understand the issues. Third, the private nature
of the proceeding is made less so by bringing in a panel of strangers
to judge the dispute. But, presumably, the proceeding would still
remain closed to the public, and the jurors would be required to
maintain confidentiality. Finally, the convenience of the privately-
judged proceeding is lessened by the scheduling and transportation
needs of the jurors. This is perhaps the biggest downside of a
privately-judged jury trial.
For some parties, the benefits of the civil jury outweigh the jury's
diminution of the advantages of a privately-judged proceeding. This
is evidenced by the fact that, prior to Russo, parties in Ohio were
electing to have privately-judged jury trials, 58 and parties in other
lS7 Id.
158 Of course, the parties were not charged with paying the jurors for their services or the
State of Ohio for the use of courthouse facilities. But parties in other jurisdictions still choose to
have privately-judged jury trials despite being required to compensate the jurors. See, e.g.,
COLO. R. Civ. P. 122(i)(3), (4).
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jurisdictions choose to have such trials. Obviously, privately-judged
jury trials are not ideal for every litigant, but such trials are
undeniably appropriate for some litigants. It is important to provide a
range of options so that litigants can choose the method best tailored
to resolve their dispute-whether that be traditional litigation,
arbitration, mediation, private judging, or privately-judged jury trials.
Thus, the Ohio legislature should authorize private judges to conduct
jury trials.
VII. JURY SELECTION FOR PRIVATELY JUDGED PROCEEDINGS
Assuming that private judges should be authorized to conduct jury
trials under section 2701.10, the issue turns to how those juries should
be selected and impaneled. In considering this question it is important
to acknowledge that prior to Russo, there was already a method in
place. No one objected to the effectiveness of the jury-selection
method for privately-judged proceedings. Rather, the argument
against privately-judged jury trials was twofold: (1) section 2701.10
does not authorize jury trials in privately-judged proceedings, and (2)
public resources should not be allocated to support private
proceedings under section 2701.10.159 Presumably, if the Ohio
legislature chooses to authorize private judges to conduct jury trials,
the only remaining objection would be the public resources
argument-which could easily be neutralized by requiring the parties
to compensate not only the judge, but also the jurors, and, possibly,
the State of Ohio. Thus, the examination of how the jury-selection
system for privately-judged proceedings should work logically must
begin with how it did work.
A. Jury Selection: How It Worked Prior to Russo
Ohio law requires that jurors be selected from either the list of
registered voters or a combined list of registered voters and licensed
drivers. 160 A new jury list is made on August 1 of each year, from
which individuals are randomly selected. 161 Those individuals
selected for jury duty are served with a notice requiring their
attendance before a commissioner at a specified time, for the purpose
of testifying concerning their own qualifications to serve as a juror.162
159 Relator's Memorandum in Support of Verified Complaint for Writ of Prohibition and
Alternative Writ of Prohibition at 11-12, Russo v. McDonnell, 852 N.E.2d 145 (Ohio 2006)
(No. 05-2130).
160 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § § 2313.06, 2313.08 (West 2007).
161 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2313.08, 2313.07 (West 2007).
162OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2313.10 (West 2007).
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The attending pool of jurors is then narrowed down through voir
dire-the court and attorneys pose questions to all of the jurors in the
pool-and then prospective jurors are excused for cause or by
peremptory challenge.'
63
As previously mentioned, the administrative judge of the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas implemented a "Court
Policy Regarding Private Judging."' 64 This policy allowed private
litigants to tap into the public-jury pool. Under the policy, litigants
choosing to have their case privately-judged were required to notify
the Clerk of the Court of Common Pleas and the administrative judge
of their intention to have a jury trial. Upon notification, the
administrative judge would order the jury commissioner to call an
additional fifty jurors "to help alleviate any possible burden on other
judges' jury trials."' 65  The parties were not charged with
compensating the jurors or the State of Ohio. 166
B. Jury Selection: How It Should Work After Russo
The threshold question in designing a jury selection system for
privately-judged proceedings is whether that system should be
independent of the public-jury system. For the following reasons, this
Note recommends that the jury-selection system for privately-judged
proceedings should be an extension of the public system and not an
independent process.
1. Impracticability of a Separate Selection Process
There is one glaring impediment to establishing an effective
private-jury selection process separate from the public system:
enforcement. Under the public-jury system, the sheriff serves the
notice to appear upon the prospective juror "personally, by mail, or by
leaving it at the juror's residence or at the juror's usual place of
163 TASK FORCE ON JURY SERVICE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF OHIO, FEBRUARY 2004, available at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/publications/
juryTF/jurytf__proposal.pdf.
6 See Relator's Memorandum in Support of Verified Complaint for Writ of Prohibition
and Alternative Writ of Prohibition at A-8, Russo, 852 N.E.2d 145 (No. 05-2130).
165 Id.
'6 This was the most contentious aspect of privately-judged jury trials. See id. at 14. ("The
burden upon the taxpayers is particularly severe because of the improper use of the public jury
pool to support private proceedings under O.R.C. § 2701.10. The Policy requires that an
additional 50 jurors be called for duty to supposedly alleviate the burdens that jury trials of
cases under O.R.C. § 2701.10 will impose upon the Court. Yet the calling of 50 additional jurors
for each private trial greatly increases the financial cost to taxpayers. In Cuyahoga County,
jurors are paid $25 per day for their services. Consequently, the calling of 50 additional jurors to
accommodate each private proceeding will cost taxpayers approximately $6,250 per week.").
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business."' 167 If a juror fails to appear she can be fined up to $250 and
punished for being in contempt of court.' 68 Under a private system,
there would be no comparable mechanism of enforcement. Jurors
could come and go as they please or completely ignore a summons
without fear of retribution.
In addition, under the public system, an employer may not
"discharge, threaten to discharge, or take any disciplinary action that
could lead to the discharge of any permanent employee who is
summoned to serve as a juror."' 69 Nor can an employer "require or
request an employee to use annual, vacation, or sick leave for time
spent responding to a summons for jury duty, time spent participating
in the jury selection process, or for time spent actually serving on a
jury.' 70 If an employer violates these provisions it "shall be punished
as for a contempt of court."'171 Under a private system, there would be
no means of preventing an employer from taking retaliatory action
against an employee for fulfilling her jury duty. Thus, the lack of an
enforcement mechanism in any private jury system stands as a major
obstacle.
Because of the inability to enforce jury duty under a private
system, jurors would have to be comprised of either volunteers or
paid participants. Given the reluctance with which most individuals
undertake jury duty, it is unlikely that there would be a significant
number of volunteers willing to serve as jurors in a private system.
But even assuming a plentiful supply of volunteers, it is highly
unlikely that the resulting jury would fairly represent a cross-section
of the community. Paid participants would be equally unsuitable as
jurors under a private system. In Cuyahoga County, jurors are paid
$25 per day for their services. Under a private system, jurors would
probably demand more for their services. Moreover, without an
enforceable prohibition on employer retaliation, the paid jurors would
primarily be comprised of the unemployed and retired-an
insufficient cross-section of the community. Thus, the jury selection
system for privately-judged proceedings must be an extension of the
public system.
167 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2313.25(A) (West 2007).
168 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2313.99(A) (West 2007).
169 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2313.18(A) (West 2007).
170 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2313.18(B) (West 2007).
171 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2313.18(D) (West 2007).
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2. Extension of the Public System
For privately-judged proceedings in which the parties elect a jury
trial, juries should be selected and impaneled in the same manner and
in the same place they would in an ordinary civil trial. 172 It is
important that jurors perceive the privately-judged proceeding to be
neither more, nor less, important than any other jury case tried in that
locale. Thus, in accordance with pre-Russo practices in Cuyahoga
County, the parties should notify the clerk of the court and the
administrative judge of their intention to have a privately-judged jury
trial. Upon notification, the administrative judge should order the jury
commissioner to call an additional fifty jurors. During the time spent
responding to a summons for jury duty and participating in the jury-
selection process, jurors should not be informed that the matter for
which they have been called differs from a normal proceeding. If
possible, voir dire should be held in the courthouse of the originating
court.
Once the jury is impaneled, the administrative judge should have
the discretion to provide a courtroom for the remainder of the
privately-judged proceeding. If a courtroom is made available, the
parties should be charged a reasonable rental fee for the use of the
facility, equipment, and personnel. The jurors should not be informed
as to the private nature of the proceeding.
However, if the remainder of the proceeding is held outside the
courthouse, jurors should be instructed that the location of the
proceeding does not affect their responsibilities or the importance of
their service. Parties should be responsible for offering transportation
from the courthouse to the location of the trial. Such transportation
should be at no cost to the jurors or the State of Ohio. Furthermore,
the parties should be required to obtain sufficient liability insurance to
assure that any injury to a juror related to such transportation is
covered without expense to the State of Ohio. The insurance should
name the State of Ohio as an additional insured. The parties should
also be responsible for providing facilities, equipment, and personnel.
Within three days following the conclusion of their service as
jurors, the parties should pay the jurors at the statutory rate. The
parties should also pay all related expenses such as meals for the
jurors and reasonable transportation costs. Payments should be made
directly from the parties to the jurors, without going through the court
172Richard P. Holme, Appointed Judges Under New C.R.C.P. 122: A Significant
Opportunity for Litigants, COLO. LAW., Sept. 2005, at 37, 46.
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or the state of Ohio. Any payments due to the court should also be
paid within three days.
This system effectively enables litigants in privately-judged
proceedings to obtain the benefits of a jury trial. It strikes a balance
between respecting the burdens of taxpayers and ensuring that the
privately-judged proceeding remains cost-effective. The Ohio
legislature should adopt this system and rewrite section 2701.10
accordingly.
CONCLUSION
Ohio courts have seen dramatic increases in the number of filings.
Congested dockets result in substantial delay--costing litigants time
and money and eroding public confidence in the system. Alternative-
dispute-resolution methods help to alleviate the burden on the courts.
Moreover, providing litigants with an array of alternatives to the
traditional courts empowers them to choose the method best-tailored
to resolve their dispute.
Privately-judged proceedings can offer substantial advantages to
the private litigant, the traditional court system, and the public
litigant: cost-efficiency, tailored expertise, appellate review, privacy,
convenience, and reduced caseloads. The common public policy and
constitutional concerns aimed at private judging are tenuous at best.
Private judging can also offer a jury trial-combining the many
advantages of private judging with the commonsensical diligence of
the civil jury. While a privately-judged jury trial is not the ideal
resolution method for all disputes, it is, undeniably, an appropriate
choice for some litigants.
The growing popularity of privately-judged jury trials was brought
to a screeching halt by the Ohio Supreme Court's interpretation of an
ambiguous statute. Although that interpretation was plausible, the
resulting policy implications negatively affect Ohio's judicial system.
The Ohio legislature should rewrite section 2701.10 to explicitly
authorize private judges to conduct jury trials in accordance with the
recommendations of this Note.
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